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I. INTRODUCTION
Shortly after the Supreme Court's opinion in New York v. Belton,' it was
suggested that some state courts might be disinclined to follow its lead when
developing their own state constitutional doctrines.2 Belton had, after all, draProfessor of Law, Cecil C. Humphreys School of Law, The University of Memphis. I wish
to thank the Cecil C. Humphreys School of Law for its support for this project.
2

453 U.S. 454 (1981).
Catherine Hancock, State Court Activism and Searches Incident to Arrest, 68 VA. L. REV.

1085, 1085-86, 1132-36 (1982).
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matically changed Fourth Amendment analysis governing a search incident to
the arrest of a motor vehicle's occupant, and, as Professor Catherine Hancock
then noted, some state courts had pursued their own courses concerning searches
of the person of an arrestee.3 Twenty years have passed since the creation of the
Belton doctrine, and during that period state constitutional developments have
indeed included a principled and often carefully-considered examination of the
doctrine's potential application in the interpretation of state guarantees. Among
those jurisdictions considering the scope of vehicular searches incident to arrest,
nine have found the Belton doctrine to be unsuitable to their state constitutional
analysis. Others have endorsed its approach. An examination of these opinions
presents a study in state constitutional diversity, as well as a context within
which some of the nuances of Belton may be explored.
Initially, this article will discuss the status of Belton as federal doctrine
today. It will then examine those state constitutional opinions which have rejected Belton's approach, in whole or in part. Finally, it will review those which
have adopted the doctrine as a matter of state constitutional law.
1I. THE FEDERAL DOCTRINE
Belton represented a sharp departure indeed from the preceding law
governing searches of the area surrounding an arrestee.
In Chimel v.
4
California, applying the basic principle that the scope of a warrantless search
must be tied to its justifications,5 the Court narrowly tailored the permissible
scope of a warrantless search incident to arrest. In Chimel, the defendant had
been arrested in his home for the burglary of a coin shop. 6 The entire threebedroom house was then searched. The officers looked in the attic, the garage,
and a small workshop, and while they were in the master bedroom and sewing
room the officers directed Chimel's wife to open drawers and move their contents. 7 Coins, tokens, and other items were seized and were subsequently admitted into evidence at Chimel's burglary trial.8
Proceeding on the assumption that Chimel's arrest had been valid, 9 the
Court addressed the issue of whether the search was permissible as incident to
that arrest.10 Extensively reviewing the history of such warrantless searches, it
3

Id. at 1121-28.

4

395 U.S. 752 (1969).

6

See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968).
395 U.S. at 753.

7

Id. at 754.
IId.

IId. at 755. The affidavit supporting the arrest was insufficient, id. at 754 n. 1, but the state
courts had held the arrest to be valid and the court elected to proceed on this basis. Id. at 754-55.
10
Id. at 755.
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stated that at the time of an arrest the justification for an immediate warrantless
search is twofold. In order to avoid endangering the safety of the arresting officer, a search for any weapon that the arrestee might use in order to resist arrest
or escape is appropriate.' Similarly, it is reasonable to search for and seize any
evidence which might be concealed or destroyed. 12 As these justifications permit a warrantless search of the arrestee, "the area into which an arrestee might
reach in order to grab
a weapon or evidentiary items must, of course, be gov'3
erned by a like rule."'
The Court concluded that there was "ample justification" for a search of
the arrestee and the area "within his immediate control.' ' 14 It construed that
phrase "to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a
weapon or destructible evidence."' 5 Reversing Chimel's conviction, the Court
found no such justification for searching any room other than that in which an
arrest occurs, or for indiscriminately searching closed inaccessible areas in that
room.' 6 Nevertheless, despite the fact-specific nature of the Chimel standard, in
United States v. Robinson 7 the Court subsequently authorized a full, routinized
search of the person of an arrestee.
In Robinson, the defendant had been arrested for driving a motor vehicle
after the revocation of his operator's permit. While Robinson was outside the
vehicle, the arresting officer patted him down, revealing an unknown object in
Robinson's left breast pocket. 18 The officer reached in and retrieved a crumpled
cigarette package. Without knowing the contents of the package but concluding
that they were not cigarettes, the officer opened it and found fourteen gelatin
capsules containing heroin.1 9 Robinson was convicted for their possession.
While the Court of Appeals held that the absence of any possible evidence concerning Robinson's vehicular offense had foreclosed reliance upon the
search as one incident to arrest, the Supreme Court disagreed. 20 The Court cited
the need to protect an arresting officer by disarming a suspect who is taken into
custody. Contrasting the situation with the brief investigative encounter justifying a frisk under Terry v. Ohio, the Court stated:
1

Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762-63.

12

Id. at 763.

13

Id.

14

Id.

15

Id.
Id. at 763, 768.

16

17

414 U.S. 218 (1973).

18

Id. at 220-23.

19

Id. at 223.

20

Id. at 223-24.
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It is scarcely open to doubt that the danger to an officer is far
greater in the case of the extended exposure which follows the
taking of a suspect into custody and transporting him to the police station than in the case of the relatively fleeting contact resulting from the typical Terry-type stop. This is an adequate
basis for treating all custodial arrests alike for purposes of
search justification.
But quite apart from these distinctions, our more fundamental disagreement with the Court of Appeals arises from its suggestion that there must be litigated in each case the issue of
whether or not there was present one of the reasons supporting
the authority for a search of the person incident to a lawful arrest .... It is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the
authority to search, and we hold that in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception
to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is
21
also a "reasonable" search under that Amendment.
The bright-line quality of Robinson's rule proved to be a precursor to
the Court's approach in Belton. With regard to the area surrounding an arrestee,
Chimel has continued to require officers to make a case-by-case determination
of those areas to which an arrestee might gain access. It remains the rule outside
of those situations governed by Robinson and Belton, and, not surprisingly, both
a desire to preserve the safety of the police and an acknowledgment of the difficulty of on-the-spot decisionmaking have often resulted in a wide construction
of the scope of that "reaching" or "grabbing" area.22
Belton was decided during a period when the Court had expressed concern about the dangers presented to officers by individuals in automobiles.23
The five justice majority appears to have been eager to address the issue of
when and how the passenger compartment of an automobile might be searched
incident to the arrest of an occupant. (An alternative and potentially straightforward basis for the decision, that the search involved had been authorized under
the "automobile exception," was not explored. 24) The facts of Belton afforded

21

Id. at 234-35.

22
See, e.g., United States v. Turner, 926 F.2d 883, 888 (9th Cir. 1991) (handcuffing and removing arrestee from room did not ameliorate danger); State v. Roberts, 623 N.W.2d 298, 305
(Neb. 2001) (same).
23
See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (holding that officers may order driver to
step out of car); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972) (holding that "tip" authorized retrieval
of gun from waist of seated occupant).
24
See Belton, 453 U.S. at 463 n.6.
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the Court an opportunity to describe more than just the general outlines of a
permissible search.
In April of 1978, an automobile occupied by four men was stopped by
Trooper Douglas Nicot for speeding on the New York Thruway. When Nicot
asked for the driver's license and registration, he learned that none of the men
owned the vehicle or was related to its owner.25 During that period, the trooper
smelled burnt marijuana and saw an envelope on the floor of the car which was
marked with the word "Supergold. 26 Trooper Nicot associated the term with
marijuana, and he ordered the men, including Roger
27 Belton, out of the car and
placed them under arrest for possession of the drug.
Trooper Nicot patted down each of the men and "split them up into four
separate areas of the Thruway . . .so they would not be in physical touching
area of each other. ' 28 He then picked up the envelope, examined it, and found
that it contained marijuana. Miranda warnings were given and each of the men
was searched. Nicot then returned to the passenger compartment of the car. He
found a black leather jacket belonging to Belton on the back seat.29 He opened
the jacket's zippered pocket and discovered cocaine. 30 The jacket and drugs
were seized, and Belton was charged with possession of a controlled substance.
After the subsequent denial of his motion to suppress the cocaine, Belton
pleaded guilty to a lesser-included offense. 31 His conviction was reversed by the
New York Court of Appeals on the ground that the search of the zippered pocket
exceeded the permissible scope of a search incident to a lawful arrest.
In its opinion, the Court, per Justice Stewart, 32 reviewed the principles
set forth in Chimel, adding that in some cases they had proven to be difficult to
apply. 33 It noted that implementation of the Fourth Amendment's protections
depended upon whether the police act "under a set of rules which, in most instances, makes it possible to reach a correct determination beforehand as to
34
whether an invasion of privacy is justified in the interest of law enforcement.
Accordingly, the Court stated that a "single, familiar standard is essential to
25

Id. at 455.

26

Id. at 455-56.

27

Id. at 456.

28

Id.

29

Id.

30

Id.

31

Id.

32

Justice Stewart had been the author of the Court's opinion in Chimel.

33

Belton, 453 U.S. at 458.

Id. (quoting Wayne R. LaFave, "Case By-Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardized Procedures": The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 127, 142). As will be noted infra, Professor LaFave has been a leading critic of the Court's approach in Belton.
34
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guide police officers, 3 5 and it praised the virtues of Robinson, in which it had
"hewed to a straightforward rule, easily applied, and predictably enforced...
,,36

Turning to the question of the appropriate scope of a search of the interior of an automobile incident to the arrest of an occupant, Justice Stewart observed that lower courts had divided on the matter when the arrestee was no
longer in the vehicle. In implementing Chimel, courts had "found no workable
definition of 'the area within the immediate control of the arrestee"' when dealing with a "recent" occupant. 37 The Court then observed that articles within the
passenger compartment of a car "are in fact generally, even if not inevitably,
within 'the area into which an arrestee might reach ....,,,38It then established
the broad rule which departed from Chimel's case-by-case methodology:
In order to establish the workable rule this category of cases
requires, we read Chimel's definition of the limits of the area
that may be searched in light of that generalization. Accordingly, we hold that when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile.
It follows from this conclusion that the police may also examine the contents of any containers found within the passenger
compartment, for if the passenger compartment is within reach
of the arrestee, so also will containers in it be within his reach.
Such a container may, of course, be searched whether it is open
or closed, since the justification for the search is not that the arrestee has no privacy interest in the container, but that the lawful custodial arrest justifies the infringement of any privacy interest the arrestee may have.39
The Court added that its holding did "no more than determine the meaning of
Chimel's principles" in this "particular and problematic" context.4 °
The search of Belton's zippered pocket was valid. The Court defined a
container subject to examination as any object capable of holding another: "It
thus includes closed or open glove compartments, consoles, or other receptacles

36

Id. (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213-14 (1979)).
Id. at 459.

37

Id. at 460.

38

Id. (quoting Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763).

39

Id. at 460-61 (citation omitted).

40

New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 n.3 (1984).

35
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located anywhere within the passenger compartment, as well as luggage, boxes,
bags, clothing, and the like. ''4 1 It is not relevant that a container could hold "neither a weaPon nor evidence of the criminal conduct for which the suspect was
arrested,
for, as in Robinson, authority to search "does not depend on what a
court may later decide was the probability in a particular arrest situation that
weapons or evidence would in fact be found upon the person of the suspect.
In their separate dissents, Justices White and Brennan noted that the Court's
approach rendered the locking of a container irrelevant as well. 4 This view has
been shared by the lower courts,45 and appears to be in keeping with the Court's
disclaiming any reliance upon an evaluation of an arrestee's expectation of privacy.46
Criticism of Belton has been vigorous and sustained.47 The most basic
issue has been whether, as the Court believed, existing law had proven to be so
unworkable that it was necessary to forego Chimel's approach in favor of a
bright-line rule. Professor Wayne LaFave, among Belton's most persuasive
critics, posed the question in 198248 and the discussion continues. The degree of
49
overbreadth inherent in Belton's approach has been another source of concern,
and it has also been argued that the Court was too quick to discount the privacy
interests involved. 50 The extent to which the police have control over an arrestee and the potential for their intentional manipulation of the situation have
also been addressed. As Professor LaFave has observed, it is the very commonplace occurrence during a typical arrest that often renders the justifications for a
Belton search factually inapplicable. 5 In addition to being placed in a police car
or handcuffed, a defendant will frequently be otherwise restrained beyond the

41

Id. at 460-61 n.4.

42

Id. at 461.

43

Id. (quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973)).
Id. at 472 (White, J.,
dissenting); id. at 468 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

44

See, e.g., United States v. McCrady, 774 F.2d 868, 871-72 (8th Cir. 1985); Staten v. United
States, 562 A.2d 90, 91-92 (D.C. 1989).
46
See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
45

47

See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH

§ 7.1(c) (3d ed. 1996) [hereinafter LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE]; Hancock, supra
note 2, at 1131; Albert W. Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. Prir.
L. REv. 227, 274-79 (1984); Wayne R. LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World:
On Drawing "Bright Lines" and "Good Faith",43 U. PrIT. L. REV. 307, 325-33 (1982).
48
LaFave, supra note 47, at 325-26.
AMENDMENT

49

See Alschuler, supra note 47, at 274-75.

50

See id. at 281.

51

See LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 47, at 455.
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area accessible to the passenger compartment. Thus, the existence of a true factual predicate for Belton is often squarely in the hands of the police:
Applying the Chimel rationale is in many respects easier in
automobile cases than in in-premises cases because the police
can, and typically do, immediately remove the arrestee from the
vehicle. Once that has been done, it is easy to take a next step
such as moving him farther from the car, handcuffing him or
closing the car door, thus ensuring the nonexistence of circumstances in which the arrestee's "control" of the car is in doubt.
In other words, the "difficulty" and "disarray" the Belton majority alluded to has been more a product of the police seeing how
much they could get away with (by not taking the abovementioned procedures) than their being confronted with inherently ambiguous situations.52
In light of these issues, it is no surprise that in applying the Belton doctrine courts have focused upon those aspects of the holding which define the
parameters within which it may be applied. By its terms, Belton only authorizes
a thorough search of a car's passenger compartment when it is contemporaneous
with the arrest.53 In a related vein, while immobilizing a suspect through handcuffing or confinement in a police car has generally been held to have no effect
upon the doctrine, 54 the removal of an arrestee from the scene entirely is sometimes seen as rendering Belton inapplicable.55 These two doctrinal issues, contemporaneousness and general physical proximity, have as a practical matter
yielded the most significant judicial limitations upon the application of the federal rule.
Belton has clearly had staying power. In January of 2001, in Floridav.
Thomas,5 6 the U. S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the question of
whether Belton's approach was conditioned upon an officer's initiating contact
with an individual while he remained an occupant of a vehicle. Although the
Court subsequently dismissed the writ for want of jurisdiction,57 it did so only

52

Id.

53

Belton, 453 U.S. at 462.

See, e.g., United States v. Woody, 55 F.3d 1257, 1269 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v.
White, 871 F.2d 41, 44 (6th Cir. 1989).
55
See, e.g., United States v. Lugo, 978 F.2d 631, 634-35 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Reno, No. 01-40121-01-SAC, 2002 WL 563563, at *4 (D. Kan. Mar. 18, 2002).
56
531 U.S. 1069 (2001).
54

57

Florida v. Thomas, 532 U.S. 774 (2001).
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after hearing oral argument.58 That argument was instructive concerning the
continuing vitality of Belton's bright-line approach.
The search in Thomas arose under circumstances in which the defendant
had driven onto the driveway of a house in which detectives were already making arrests for narcotics offenses. 59 An officer who was waiting outside in his
patrol car saw Thomas leave the vehicle. 6° The officer met him at the rear of the
car and, "asked him his name and whether he had a driver's license. A check of
Thomas's driver's license revealed an outstanding warrant for a probation violation.",6' The officer arrested Thomas, handcuffed him, and took him into the
house. 62 "The officer then went back outside, alone, and searched Thomas'
car., 6 3 The search revealed a plastic bag containing white residue near the
driver's side door, and three small bags of a white substance in the glove compartment. All tested positive for methamphetamine. 64 Five minutes elapsed
between the time Thomas had left his car and the search.65 Thomas was charged
with possession of the drugs and related offenses, and the trial court granted his
motion to suppress the evidence discovered during the search. The Court of
Appeal reversed, finding the search permissible under Belton.6 6
The Supreme Court of Florida quashed the decision below. 67 It observed that searches occurring beyond the scope of Belton's intended reach require a case-specific assessment of the presence of Chimel's factors concerning
officer safety and the preservation of evidence.68 The court found the situation
69
before it to be beyond the contemplation of the Supreme Court in Belton.
Framing the issue as "whether Belton extends to a situation where the first contact the defendant has with the officer occurs after exiting the vehicle, 70 it endorsed the interpretation of Belton by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit in United States v. HudginsT:
58

The transcript of the oral argument is available at 2001 WL 421613.

59

Thomas v. State, 761 So. 2d 1010, 1010 (Fla. 1999).

60

Id.

61

Id.

62

Thomas, 532 U.S. at 776; Thomas, 761 So. 2d at 1010.

63

Thomas, 532 U.S. at 776.

64

Thomas, 761 So. 2d at 1011.

65

Id.

66

Thomas, 532 U.S. at 776.
Thomas, 761 So. 2d at 1010.

67

69

See id. at 1012.
See id. at 1013.

70

Id.

71

52 F.3d 115, 119 (6th Cir. 1995).

69
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Our decisions have consistently upheld the search of the passenger compartment of an automobile when the officer initiated
contact with the defendant while the defendant was still within
the automobile.... However, where the defendant has voluntarily exited the automobile and begun walking away from the
automobile before the officer has initiated contact with him, the
case does not fall within Belton's bright-line rule, and a caseby-case analysis of the reasonableness
of the search under
72
Chimel becomes necessary.
Thus concluding that Belton was inapplicable, the Supreme Court of Florida
remanded for a determination by the trial court
of "whether the factors in
' 73
vehicle.
Thomas'
of
search
the
justif[ied]
Chimel
After the Supreme Court granted certiorari, the parties did not brief the
jurisdictional issue,74 and oral argument proceeded to the merits of the Belton
question. That proceeding was noteworthy for its lack of any implication in the
comments of the Justices that Belton' s bright-line approach might be abandoned
or significantly modified by the Court. Instead, the questioning by the Justices
emphasized how the parameters of the doctrine's application come into play
when its bright-line character is measured against the reasons for a search incident to arrest. The questioning of Petitioner focused principally upon the issues
of both temporal and physical proximity of the defendant to the search. Since
Thomas was in the house and in the custody of the police at that time, the question of whether he had been removed from the scene was raised:
QUESTION: And do you say that Belton allows the person
outside the car to be taken away, secured, removed, and then the
officers can go back and search the car?
MR. KRAUSS: Yes, we do, Your Honor, forQUESTION: Wasn't one of the stated objectives of the Belton
rule to protect officers from the person connected with the car
from reaching in and getting weapons or damaging the officer?
MR. KRAUSS: We would submit, Your Honor, that the ability
to effect valid arrest arises at the moment of that arrest. At the
time of the arrest, Mr. Thomas was right by the car. Quite
frankly72

Thomas, 761 So. 2d at 1013 (quoting Hudgins, 52 F.3d at 119 (emphasis and citations omit-

ted)).
73

Id. at 1014.

74

See Thomas, 532 U.S. at 777.
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QUESTION: But the search of the vehicle came later. Is there
some temporal or spatial limitation to the Belton rule, or do you
say there's [sic] no such limitations?
MR. KRAUSS: No. No, there obviously is a limitation at some
point, but certainly this case is not one of them. This wasQUESTION: This might be, if you take the person away.75
76
This overall concern with Belton's contemporaneousness requirement
did not at all suggest that the Justices were reconsidering its basic approach.
(While the issue of the Court's jurisdiction was discussed only briefly, 77 jurisdiction was ultimately found to be lacking because of the Florida Supreme
Court's remand for factfinding and a determination of whether the search was
permissible under Chimel. 8 ) Because of the seemingly entrenched status of
Belton, the tenor of the oral argument in Thomas does make it apparent that state
constitutional developments will continue to play a central role in the evolution
of any critical rethinking of Belton's assumptions.

III. JURISDICTIONS REJECTING OR MODIFYING BELTON
As would be expected, among those jurisdictions which have declined
to adopt Belton's rule as part of their state constitutional law, a few have rejected it entirely and retained a fact-specific inquiry supported by Chimel's familiar methodology and justifications. Pennsylvania, New Mexico and Nevada
are in this category. The Supreme Court of Louisiana has also made a statement
to this effect, but in practice its approach is ambiguous. Other states have chosen to modify the federal approach in significant respects. Washington, New
Jersey, Wyoming, Oregon and New York have all developed their own state
constitutional doctrines.79

75

Tr. of Oral Arg. of Petitioner, at 4-5, Florida v. Thomas, 532 U.S. 774 (No. 00-391), avail-

able at 2001 WL 421613.
76
See also id. at 5-8, 17-21.
77

See id. at 24-25, 36-37.
Thomas, 532 U.S at 778-80. The Court held that the judgment was not final within the
meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a), authorizing the Court to review "[flinal judgments or decrees
rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had ....
It did not fall
within one of those exceptions in which, for jurisdictional purposes, the Court had treated a state
judgment as final while further proceedings were to take place in state court. See id. at 1908-10.
79
States are, of course, free to place statutory restrictions upon searches of vehicles incident to
arrest. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Toole, 448 N.E.2d 1264 (Mass. 1983); State v. Anderson, 910
P.2d 180 (Kan. 1996).
78
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EndorsingChimel's Fact-SpecificInquiry: Pennsylvania,New Mexico,
and Nevada

In 1995, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania chose to continue to follow
relatively recent, pre-Belton doctrine under Article I, Section 8 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution 0 and limit the search of an automobile incident to
arrest to those areas which might permissibly be examined under a Chimel
analysis. In Commonwealth v. White, 81 the defendant was arrested in his car for
a drug sale, and was removed from the vehicle. 82 Police partially entered the
automobile through the open doors, and noticed a marijuana cigarette on the
console. They then opened a brown paper bag which was between the front
seats and discovered cocaine. 83 The court framed the issue as whether the warrantless search of the car was permissible in the absence of exigent circumstances "after its occupants have been arrested and are outside the automobile in
police custody." 84 After addressing the insufficiency of the automobile exception to justify the search, the court turned to Belton.
It noted that one year before Belton it had addressed the same issue in
Commonwealth v. Timko. 85 There, the arrestee had been driving erratically and
was removed from his van after he had reached for a zippered bag and had attempted to flee.86 Timko was handcuffed outside of the vehicle, and a search of
the bag revealed a loaded revolver and marijuana. The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania required that those items be suppressed. 87 In White, the court reiterated that Timko had limited a warrantless automobile search incident to arrest
"to areas and clothing immediately accessible to the person arrested.,, 88 It
added, "the court [in Timko] made it clear that the purpose of this search is to
80

The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from
unreasonable searches and seizures, and no warrant to search any place or to seize
any person or things shall issue without describing them as nearly as may be, nor
without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation subscribed to by the affiant.

PA. CONST. art. I, § 8.

81
82

669 A.2d 896 (Pa. 1995).
See id. at 898. Accounts differed as to whether the removal was forcible. Id.

83

Id.

84

Id.

85

417 A.2d 620 (Pa. 1980).
Id. at 622. The defendant had also struck two vehicles when parking and addressed ob-

86

scenities at the officers. The officer had also seen boxes marked "shotgun shells" in the car, and
had to smash the window of the van in order to remove Timko. Id.
87
Id. at 623.
88

669 A.2d at 902.
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prevent the arrestee from securing weapons or destroying contraband., 89 The
upon the applicability of those principles to
court also noted Timko's emphasis
9
containers within the vehicle. 0
Reviewing the development of Pennsylvania constitutional law during
the preceding fifteen years, the court stated:
[T]he thrust of Timko is even more compelling today than it was
in 1980 because this court has increasingly emphasized the privacy interests inherent in Article I, Section 8 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution. . . . By contrast, the United States
Supreme Court has deemphasized the privacy interests inherent
in the Fourth Amendment. As the Court stated in Belton:

[T]he justification for the search is ... that the lawful custodial arrest justifies the infringement of any privacy interest the arrestee may have.
As we stated in Commonwealth v. Mason ... this court, when
considering the relative importance of privacy as against securing criminal convictions, has struck a different balance than has
the United States Supreme Court, and under the Pennsylvania
balance, an individual's privacy interests are given greater deference than under federal law. 91
The court emphasized that, absent an independent exigency such as a need to
search for explosives,9 2 Chimel's two justifications of preventing access to
weapons and the destruction of evidence permit only the search of the immediate area occupied by the arrestee during his custody.93
The Court of Appeals of New Mexico has also recently confined a
search incident to arrest to the actual "reaching" area defined by Chimel. In
State v. Arredondo,94 the defendant had been the subject of an investigatory stop
prompted by the suspicion that he had recently committed an assault with a gun.
His car had matched the general description of the assailant's and he had taken
evasive action before being stopped. He then responded to the officer's request
for information by stating that his license was suspended, he had no insurance,
89

Id.

90

/d. at 902 n.4.

91
92

Id. at 902 (citations omitted).
See id. at 902 n.5.

93

Id. at 902.

944 P.2d 276 (N.M. 1997), overruled on other grounds by State v. Steinzig, 987 P.2d 409
(N.M. 1999).
94
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and he was wanted on warrants. 95 The officer called in and confirmed the suspension of his driver's license. Arredondo was asked to step out of the car and
he was frisked. Looking for a weapon, the officer checked the area between the
front seats and the adjacent floor, discovering a marijuana cigarette and some
rolling papers.96 The officer spoke briefly with the defendant and then returned
to the car to scan the dashboard with his flashlight. Looking into a small hole
"about the size of a cigarette lighter" that appeared to have been cut into the
dashboard, he saw a plastic bag containing a white powder. The officer retrieved the bag, which was later determined to contain cocaine. 97
The Court of Appeals found the investigatory stop and the initial search
of the car's seating and floor areas to be permissible, as a limited search for
weapons. 98 The discovery and seizure of the marijuana and rolling papers were
consequently valid. 99 The protective search for weapons could not, however,
extend to the "further search of the vehicle and intrusion into the small hole in
the vehicle's dashboard[,]" as no weapon may have been retrieved by the defendant from that area. 1°° The court found that the officer's motivation was to
search for more drug evidence, and it found no exigent circumstances to support
that search. 0 1 It then turned to the question of whether the search of the hole
could be justified as incident to an arrest.
The court noted that Belton had established a bright-line rule governing
the situation. However, it also observed that the Supreme Court of New Mexico
had recently considered the automobile exception under Article II, Section 10 of
the New Mexico Constitution 10 2 and had rejected the federal approach which
permitted the warrantless search of a vehicle upon probable cause. In State v.
Gomez, 10 3 the court had determined that a warrantless search of an automobile
and its contents required a "particularized showing of exigent circumstances,"
which had been defined as "an emergency situation requiring swift action to
prevent imminent danger to life or serious damage to property, or to forestall the
95

Id. at 279.

96

Id.

97

Id. at 280.

98

Id.

99

Id. at 282.

100 Id. at 283.
1l Id. at 283-84; see infra note 104 and accompanying text.
102

The people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes and effects, from unreasonable searches and seizures, and no warrant to search any place, or seize any
person or thing, shall issue without describing the place to be searched, or the persons or things to be seized, nor without a written showing of probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation.

N.M. CONST. art. II, § 10.
103
932 P.2d 1 (N.M. 1997).
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imminent escape of a suspect or destruction of evidence."' 10 4 In Gomez, the
court repeatedly described the federal automobile exception as a "bright line"
approach, 10 5 premised upon generalizations about vehicular mobility and diminished expectations of privacy, 10 6 and held that, instead, "[q]uite simply, if there
is no reasonable basis for believing an automobile will be moved or its search
will otherwise be compromised by delay, then a warrant is required.' ' 10 7 The
New Mexico Supreme Court's conclusion was based upon
what the court de10 8
scribed as New Mexico's "strong preference for warrants."'
In Arredondo, the Court of Appeals regarded Gomez as having eschewed bright-line rules and emphasizing the "fact-specific nature" of the reasonableness issue. 1°9 Accordingly, the court believed that under Article II,
Section 10 a fact-specific inquiry was required in defining the legality of a
search of an automobile incident to arrest. As nothing indicated that the small
hole in the dashboard was in fact under the defendant's immediate control, its
examination was illegal." 0
The Supreme Court of Nevada has reached a similar conclusion. In
State v. Greenwald,' " the court discussed the issue, but its twofold objection to
the search left that opinion open to the interpretation that the search's invalidity
may have been due to a lack of contemporaneousness with the arrest. A subsequent observation by the court in State v. Harnisch12 does, however, make it
clear that Belton has been rejected in Nevada.
Greenwaldinvolved the arrest of a motorcyclist for traffic infractions." 3
The defendant was handcuffed and placed in a police car, and the motorcycle
was thoroughly searched from front to rear.' 14 The trooper examined the con105

Id. at 12 (quoting State v. Copeland, 727 P.2d 1342, 1346 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986)).
See id. at 10, 13.

106

Id. at 11.

107

Id. at 13 (emphasis in original).

104

Id. at 11. See generally Robert F. Williams, New Mexico State Constitutional Law Comes
of Age, 28 N.M. L. REv. 379, 384 (1998). For a discussion of Gomez and its interstitial approach
to state constitutional decisionmaking in light of New Mexico's earlier mirroring of federal doctrine, see Gene E. Franchini, New Mexico Independent Adjudication, 61 ALB. L. REv. 1495
(1998); Michael B. Browde, State v. Gomez and the Continuing Conversation Over New Mexico's
State ConstitutionalRights Jurisprudence,28 N.M. L. REv. 387 (1998); Jennifer Cutcliffe Juste,
Note, Constitutional Law - The Effect of State Constitutional Interpretation on New Mexico's
Civil and CriminalProcedure - State v. Gomez, 28 N.M. L. REv. 355 (1998).
109
944 P.2d at 284.
108

110 Id.
11
112

858 P.2d 36 (Nev. 1993).
931 P.2d 1359, 1365-66 (Nev. 1997).

113

858 P.2d at 37.

114

Id.
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tents of the gas and oil tanks, buckled saddlebags, and even a flashlight." 5 The
saddlebag search revealed a firearm, a holster, a cartridge clip, and several
"hits" of LSD. The court stated that it was hard "to escape the conclusion that
the trooper was searching for contraband," adding:
Quite obviously the officer in this case was not making a search
incident to Greenwald's arrest, as the search was made some
time after the arrest and at a time that Greenwald was well secured in a police vehicle. As the State points out in its opening
brief... the authority to search incident to arrest derives from
the need to disarm and prevent any evidence from being concealed or destroyed. With Greenwald safely locked away in a
police car, there was no conceivable "need" to disarm him or
concealing or destroying evidence; so we
prevent him from
16
leave this point.'
Dictum by the court in Harnisch indicates that the placing of Greenwald
in the police car had rendered the search invalid. In Harnisch, the trunk of the
defendant's car had been examined, and the court noted that the search was not
valid incident to arrest. 1 In support of this conclusion, it added, citing
Greenwald, that "[b]ecause Harnisch was in custody at the time of the search of
the car, there was no 'need' to disarm him or prevent him from concealing or19
8
similar reference to Greenwald in Rice v. State"
destroying evidence."" 1A
20
echoes this interpretation.
Conflicting Signals: Louisiana

B.

The most ambivalent rejection of Belton may have occurred in
Louisiana, where an unequivocal statement in strongly-worded dictum by the
Supreme Court in 1982 appears to have been undermined by subsequent holdings. In that dictum in State v. Hernandez,121 the court squarely disapproved of
Belton's view and endorsed the Chimel approach under Article I, Section 5 of
the Louisiana Constitution.122 As the court stated, Belton was inapplicable to
115

Id.

116

Id.
931 P.2d at 1365.
Id.at 1366.

117
118
19

936 P.2d 319 (Nev. 1997).

120

Id.at 322.

121

410 So. 2d 1381, 1384-85 (La. 1982).

Every person shall be secure in his person, property, communications, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches, seizures, or invasions of prihttps://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol105/iss1/6
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the case, since the automobile was not searched contemporaneously with defendant's arrest and he had in fact been taken to the police station. 23 Nevertheless,
the court observed:
Although the Belton case is distinguishable and therefore inapplicable here, it should be noted that we do not consider it to be
a correct rule of police conduct under our state constitution....
Our state constitution's declaration of the right to privacy contains an affirmative establishment of a right of privacy, explicit
protections against unreasonable searches, seizures or invasions
of property and communications, as well as houses, papers and
effects, and gives standing to any person adversely affected by
a violation of these safeguards to raise the illegality in the
courts.... This constitutional declaration of right is not a duplicate of the Fourth Amendment or merely coextensive with it; it
is one of the most conspicuous instances in which our citizens
have chosen a higher standard of individual liberty than that afforded by the jurisprudence interpreting the federal constitution.
...For these reasons we adhere to our well-settled rule in construing our state constitution: when a custodial arrest is made,
because of the danger that the person arrested may seek to use a
weapon or that evidence may be concealed or destroyed, the arresting officer may, to safeguard himself and others and to prevent the loss of evidence, conduct a prompt, warrantless search
of the arrestee's person and the area within his control - construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he could
24
gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.1
In that same year, however, the Supreme Court of Louisiana rendered
an apparently conflicting opinion which reflected an endorsement of Belton's
approach. In State v. Drott, 25 defendant, a private security guard, had been the
subject of an investigation of a series of thefts. 26 He was stopped while driving
vacy. No warrant shall issue without probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, the persons or things to
be seized, and the lawful purpose or reason for the search. Any person adversely
affected by a search or seizure conducted in violation of this Section shall have
standing to raise its illegality in the appropriate court.
LA. CONST. art. I, § 5.

123

410 So. 2d at 1384.

124

Id. at 1385 (citations omitted).

125

412 So. 2d 984 (La. 1982).

126 Id. at 985.
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his truck, and was asked to step out of the vehicle. 127 Within a minute of the
stop, the officer observed a five dollar bill sticking out from the crack between
the back and bottom of the driver's seat. 28 He retrieved the bill, and two twenty
dollar bills came out as well. 129 A further search revealed several hundred dollars in cash, bearing serial numbers which had been recorded by the crime victim during the investigation. 130 Finding that Drott had been lawfully arrested at
the time of the stop, 131 the court discussed whether the search was permissible

incident to the arrest. It held:
The search incident to arrest is limited to the area within the arrestee's immediate control.... It is permissible to search the in-

terior of an automobile after arresting its occupants when they
remain in proximity to the vehicle.
In the recent U.S. Supreme Court case of New York v. Belton,
... the

court clearly set forth the permissible limits of the war-

rantless search of an automobile following the arrest of one of
its occupants:
"Accordingly, we hold that when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as
a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger
132
compartment ....
The search was upheld, although Justice Dennis would have granted a rehearing
to consider the state constitutional issue in light of Hernandez. Hernandez was
not mentioned in the opinion of the court.
Since Drott, Louisiana's Court of Appeal for the Fourth Circuit has
noted the existence of an apparent conflict between Hernandez and Drott concerning the applicability of Belton under the Louisiana Constitution. In State v.
Wilson,' 33 the arresting officer's observation of a weapon in the automobile distinguished the situation from a typical search incident to arrest.134 Nevertheless,
the court validated it under the latter rationale, and held that, despite his handcuffing at the rear of the vehicle, Wilson was in sufficient "proximity" to his car

131

Id. at 986.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 987.

132

Id. at 986 (quoting Belton, 453 U.S. at 460).

133

457 So. 2d 75 (La. App. 1984), cert. denied,462 So. 2d 208 (La. 1985).

134

457 So. 2d at 76.

127
128
129
130
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to distinguish the facts of Hernandez.135 It added that despite its differentiating
of Hernandez, "[p]erhaps the apparent conflict between Hernandez and Drott,
vis a vis the Belton standard of vehicle searches incident to arrests,
may be re' 36
solved by the Louisiana Supreme Court in the appropriate case."'
That court has not done so. Instead, the dictum of Hernandez is seemingly regarded by lower courts as applicable when a defendant has been removed from the scene. 137 The recent holding in State v. Freeman,3 8 in which
the search was upheld as incident to arrest when a defendant was secured by
handcuffs in a police car, illustrates the apparent acceptance of Belton. 139 As
one Court of Appeal has noted, "[d]espite the restrictive language of Hernandez,
it does not have a blanket application to all Louisiana cases which deal with
automobile searches incident to custodial arrests. The Louisiana Supreme Court
has, both prior and subsequent
to Hernandez, either generally applied or at least
4
cited with approval Belton."'1'
C.

Accommodating Privacy Interests: Washington

In State v. Stroud,14 1 focusing upon the privacy interests protected by
the Washington Constitution, a four-justice plurality of the state Supreme Court
142
endorsed the bright-line quality of Belton's approach, but modified its reach.
The reasoning of that plurality opinion has since been followed. 43 Stroud involved the arrest of two defendants for the theft of vending machine proceeds.
At the time of the arrest, they were standing outside of their vehicle, and they
were placed in a patrol car. 144 The officer then looked in the defendant's car and
saw a revolver on the back seat. He seized the weapon and conducted a search
of the passenger compartment. An unzipped luggage bag was found to contain a
sawed off shotgun, ammunition for that weapon, and a container containing a
white powder. The unlocked glove compartment contained spoons, syringes,
and a container full of a clear liquid.145 A residue in the spoons was later identi135

Id. at 78.

136

Id.

137

See State v. Davis, 452 So. 2d 1208, 1213 (La. App. 1984).

138

727 So. 2d 630 (La. App. 1998).

139
Id. at 634-35. The search was also upheld, alternatively, under the automobile exception.
Id. at 635.
140
Davis,452 So. 2d at 1213.
141 720 P.2d 436 (Wash. 1986).
142
Chief Justice Dolliver and Justice Durham separately concurred in the result. See id. at 441.
143

See State v. Fladebo, 779 P.2d 707, 711 (Wash. 1989).

'4

Stroud, 720 P.2d at 437.

145

Id. at 437-38.
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fied as heroin and methaphetamine, and the two were convicted of possession of
the drugs and being felons in possession of a firearm.146 The plurality opinion
addressed the question of the legality of the search incident to the defendents'
arrest in the context of what is deemed part of the "automobile exception" to the
warrant requirement implied in Article 1, Section 7 of the Washington Constituof whether the approach of
tion. 147 Its analysis squarely presented the issue
148
Belton commended itself under that provision.
The Supreme Court of Washington had addressed the question of a
search incident to arrest only two years earlier in State v. Ringer.149 There, after
an extensive historical analysis, the court had held that the two traditional justifications for a search incident to arrest - preventing access to weapons and the
destruction of evidence - required a case-by-case, Chimel-like assessment of the
exigencies of a situation before a warrantless search. 50 In Ringer, as the defendant was in a patrol car and his vehicle was immobilized, the search was improper. 15 1 Stroud afforded the court an opportunity to reexamine that earlier
as striking for its rejection of Ringer as it
approach, and the plurality opinion
152 is
is for its modification of Belton.
The Stroud plurality began its analysis by noting that, because of its belief that the Washington Constitution affords greater protection against warrantless searches than does the Fourth Amendment, it declined simply to follow
federal precedent. This conclusion was based upon a number of factors. First,
the framers of Article 1, Section 7 had rejected a provision identical to the federal provision, adopting instead language stating that "[n]o person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.' 53
The plurality observed that "[tlhis provision, unlike any provision in the federal
constitution, explicitly protects the privacy rights of Washington citizens....
146

Id. at 438.

147

Id.

148

Id.

149

674 P.2d 1240 (Wash. 1983).

150

Id. at 1248; see Stroud, 720 P.2d at 440.

151

674 P.2d at 1248.

152

Justice Utter has observed that four new justices had joined the court during the intervening

period. See Robert F. Utter, The Practice of PrincipledDecision-Making in State Constitutionalism: Washington's Experience, 65 TEMP. L. REv. 1153, 1159 (1992). Commentators have long
recognized the importance of Washington's unique constitutional history and tradition in the development of its state constitutional law. See, e.g., Robert F. Utter, Freedom and Diversity in a
FederalSystem: Perspectives on State Constitutionsand the Washington Declarationof Rights, 7
U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 491 (1984); Sanford E. Pitler, Comment, The Origin and Development
of Washington's Independent Exclusionary Rule: ConstitutionalRight and Constitutionally Compelled Remedy, 61 WASH. L. REv. 459 (1986).
153
WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 7, quoted in Stroud, 720 P.2d at 439.
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and these privacy rights
' 54include the freedom from warrantless searches absent
special circumstances."'
Secondly, the Washington Supreme Court's recent interpretations of the
state constitution in search and seizure cases had protected the privacy rights of
Washington citizens more than would have been the case under federal doctrine.' 5 The plurality added, "During a period in which the federal interpretation more carefully limits an individual's privacy rights, we decline to follow
the federal lead as our' 56state constitution provides specific additional guarantees
of a right to privacy.'
The plurality concluded, however, that although its independent interpretation of Article 1, Section 7 was more protective than federal law, the search
of the defendants' car was lawful. 157 It then expressly rejected that portion of
Ringer which had employed a fact-specific approach.
We cannot agree with all of the reasoning used in Ringer....
The Ringer holding makes it virtually impossible for officers to
decide whether or not a warrantless search would be permissible. Weighing the "totality of circumstances" is too much of a
burden to put on police officers who must make a decision to
search with little more than a moment's reflection....
We agree with the Supreme Court's decision [in Belton] to draw
a clearer line to aid police enforcement, although because of our
state's additional protection of privacy rights we must draw
the
58
line differently than did the United States Supreme Court.
The opinion regarded the dual purposes for a Belton search as significant (as well as the exigency permitting the search of a car's trunk upon probable cause), but added, "because of our heightened privacy protection, we do not
believe that these exigencies always allow a search. Rather, these exigencies
must be balanced '' against
whatever privacy interests the individual has in the
5
articles in the car. §
154

Stroud, 720 P.2d at 439 (citing State v. White, 640 P.2d 1061 (Wash. 1982)).

155 Id. The opinion cited State v. Myrick, 688 P.2d 151 (Wash. 1984) (federal open fields
doctrine distinguished); State v. Riner, 674 P.2d 1240 (Wash. 1983) (earlier approach to search
incident to arrest); State v. White, 640 P.2d 1061 (Wash. 1982) (exclusionary rule employed after
application of unconstitutional statute); State v. Simpson, 622 P.2d 1199 (Wash. 1980) (automatic
standing).
156 Stroud, 720 P.2d at 439.
157
158

Id. at 440.
Id.

159 Id.
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The plurality recalled that the court had recognized that under the
Washington Constitution a person has a legitimate expectation of privacy in a
vehicle he or she possesses. 6° This had been extended to a non-visible vehicle
identification number, and must also be true "of articles within the vehicle
which are also not visible because, for example, they are in a suitcase or the
glove compartment."' 61 The court had also held earlier that "the act of locking a
car 'manifests a subjective expectation of privacy which is objectively justifiable[.] ' "1 62 The plurality added, "Thus additional
' 63privacy expectations must also
result from locking articles within a container."'
The plurality concluded that a reasonable balance could be struck between the protection of individual privacy interests and the need for effective
law enforcement. Accordingly, during an arrest, "including the time immediately subsequent to the suspect's being arrested, handcuffed, and placed in a
patrol car," police are permitted to search a vehicle's passenger compartment.' 64
"However, if the officers encounter a locked container or locked glove compartment, they may not unlock and search either container without obtaining a
warrant."' 165 The plurality continued:
The rationale for this is twofold. First, by locking the container,
the individual has shown that he or she reasonably expects the
contents to remain private.... Secondly, the danger that the individual either could destroy or hide evidence located within the
container or grab a weapon is minimized. The individual would
have to spend time unlocking the container, during which time
the officers have an opportunity to prevent the individual's access to the contents of the container. This rule will more adequately address the needs of officers and privacy interests of66individuals than the rules set forth by either Belton or Ringer.
Since Stroud, the Washington Supreme Court has continued to fine-tune
the scope of searches incident to arrest in accordance with the privacy interests
guaranteed under the Washington Constitution. In 1999, in State v. Parker,167 a
four-justice plurality stated that the arrest of a vehicle's occupant does not, by
160

Stroud, 720 P.2d at 441.

161

Id.

162

Id. (quoting State v. Simpson, 622 P2d 1199, 1210 (Wash. 1980)).

163

Id.

164

Id.

165

Id.

166

Id. (citation omitted).

167

987 P.2d 73 (Wash. 1999).
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itself, provide "authority of law" under Article 1, Section 7 to search a non68
arrested occupant or personal belongings clearly associated with him or her.'
A fifth justice, Justice Alexander, concurred with that principle. 169 The plurality
stated that this result was mandated by the privacy interests of the nonarrested
individual, 7 ° which "is independent . . .and is not diminished merely upon
stepping into an automobile with others."' 17 1 The plurality endorsed the standard
for evaluating containers which had been set forth by the Wyoming Supreme
Court in Houghton v. State172 in the context of examining a search of a vehicle
upon probable cause. Under that approach, police may assume that all containers may be searched unless they "know or should know that the container is the
personal effect of a passenger who is not independently suspected of criminal
activity and where there is no reason to believe contraband is concealed in the
personal effect immediately prior to the search." 173 The plurality expressly disagreed with the U.S. Supreme Court's rejection of the Wyoming test. 174 Justice
Alexander, while agreeing with the conclusion that knowledge of a passenger's
ownership precludes a search incident to the arrest of the driver, disagreed "that
the officers should be similarly inhibited if they merely 'should know." ' ' 75 He
believed that feature of the Houghton test
injected a subjective standard which
176
ran "counter to the rationale" of Stroud.

168 Id. at 83.

A similar state constitutional argument was raised before the Supreme Court of
North Dakota in State v. Gilberts, 497 N.W.2d 93, 95 (N.D. 1993), but the state argument was not
separately discussed in the opinion. The court stated that Belton's rationale foreclosed the search
of a jacket belonging to a non-arrested passenger. Id. at 97.
169 Parker, 987 P.2d at 90 (Alexander, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
170

Id. at 81-83.

171 Id. at 83 n.7. The plurality stated:

[Wihile we have recognized in the context of an automobile stop that nonsuspect companions may pose a danger to officers, a generalized concern for officer safety has never justified a full search of nonarrested companions. Even in
the context of an automobile stop, when a person is not under arrest the scope
of any search of such individual is limited to ensure officer safety only and
must be supported by objective suspicions that the person searched may be
armed or dangerous.
Id. at 82 (citation omitted).
172
956 P.2d 363 (Wyo. 1998), rev'd, 526 U.S. 295 (1999).
173 Parker,987 P.2d at 83.
174 See id. at 83 n.7.
175
176

See id. at 90 (Alexander, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
See id.
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Limiting the Predicate Offense: New Jersey

D.

In State v. Pierce, 77 the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the
Belton doctrine is inapplicable under Article I, paragraph 7 of the New Jersey
Constitution178 when an individual has been arrested for a traffic offense. Although the parameters of this classification were not clearly specified in the
opinion, the court found the justifications for the search less compelling in the
context of "a routine violation of ... [a] motor vehicle [statute].' 7 In an interesting passage, the court observed "that the Belton rule, as applied to arrests for
traffic offenses, creates an unwarranted incentive for police officers to 'make
custodial arrests which they otherwise would not make as a cover for a search
which the Fourth Amendment otherwise prohibits.""'0 80 New Jersey courts have
not extended Pierce'slimitation to any other category of arrests. '8
Eileen Pierce had been one of two passengers in a van whose driver,
Nicholas Grass, had been stopped for speeding and arrested for driving with a
suspended driver's license. The arrestee was handcuffed and placed in a patrol
car, and Pierce and the male passenger, Bernardo, were asked to leave the vehicle. They were patted down and no weapons were discovered. 82 When asked
for identification, Pierce stated that she had none. Three officers were on the
scene, and Pierce and Bernardo were "secured .

.

. behind the van" while an

officer entered the vehicle. 83 That officer saw a large, "hunting-type" knife on
the front console. He found a latched metal camera case behind the driver's
seat, and inside he found a revolver, "four loaded rounds of .357 magnum ammunition," and "two spent rounds."' 84 Inside the van the officer also found "two
breed member motorcycle gang jackets" and a companion jacket which appeared to be a woman's, bearing a patch that said "Nick's property."' 85 In the
pocket of that jacket the officer found a cellophane packet containing a trace
177

642 A.2d 947 (N.J. 1994).

178

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrant
shall issue except upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the papers and things to be
seized.

N.J. CONST. art. 1, par. 7.
179

Pierce, 642 A.2d at 960.

18o

Id. at 961 (quoting 3

181

See State v. Judge, 645 A.2d 1224, 1229 n.4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994).

182

See Pierce,642 A.2d at 948.

183

Id.

194

Id.
Id.

185

LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE,
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amount of a white powder, later determined to be cocaine.' 86 The three were
indicted for possession of the weapon without a permit, receiving stolen property (the revolver), and possession of the cocaine. After the denial of 87Pierce's
motion to suppress the evidence, she pleaded guilty to the drug offense.
The New Jersey Supreme Court found the arrest of Grass to be statutorily authorized and constitutionally valid. 8 8 Turning to Belton, it stated that it
had not before considered the applicability of Belton's approach in the context
of the state's constitutional law.' 89 The only issue before it was the appropriateness of Belton in the context of "warrantless arrests for motor-vehicle offenses."' 190 The court noted that on several prior occasions it had held that
Article I, paragraph 7 afforded greater protections against unreasonable searches
and seizures than did the federal Constitution. 9' It added, "That body of decisional law reflects a steadily-evolving commitment by our State courts to provide enhanced protection for our citizens against encroachment of their right to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures."' 92 That commitment "fortifie[d]" the court's conviction
that it should not apply the rule of Belton for a
1 93
motor vehicle violation.
The court emphasized that the twofold rationale underlying Chimel is
significantly diminished when the basis for the arrest is a routine violation of a
motor vehicle statute.
We are mindful that police officers are at risk whenever they
make a vehicular stop, and that a significant percentage of assaults on police officers occur in the course of traffic stops.
186

Id.

187

See id. at 948-49. The charges against Bernardo were dismissed, and Grass pleaded guilty

to possession of the handgun without a permit. See id. at 949.
188
See id. at 949-52, 958-59.
189

See id. at 958.

190

See id. at 960. One commentator has described Pierce'sreluctance to address Belton in a

non-traffic setting as "very disturbing from a police trainer's perspective." Ronald Susswein, The
Practical Effect of the "New Federalism" on Police Conduct in New Jersey, 7 SETON HALL
CONST. L.J. 859, 870 (1997).

191

See Pierce, 642 A.2d at 960. The Court cited as examples State v. Hempele, 576 A.2d 793

(N.J. 1990) (invalidating warrantless searches of garbage bags left on curb for collection); State v.
Novembrino, 519 A.2d 820 (N.J. 1987) (rejecting federal "good faith" exception to exclusionary
rule for search warrant issued without probable cause); State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952 (N.J. 1982)
(recognizing constitutionally protected interest in telephone toll billing records); State v. Alston,
440 A.2d 1311 (N.J. 1981) (recognizing possessory interest in automobile sufficient to confer
standing); State v. Johnson, 346 A.2d 66 (N.J. 1975) (holding that valid consent to search depends
upon knowledge of right to refuse).
192
See Pierce, 642 A.2d at 960.
193

See id.
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Nevertheless, out of the substantial number of ordinary citizens
who might on occasion commit commonplace traffic offenses,
the vast majority are unarmed. Moreover, when the predicate
offense is a motor-vehicle violation, the vehicle stopped by police would not ordinarily contain evidence at risk of destruction
that pertains to the underlying offense, except in the case of violations of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 (driving while intoxicated) and
N.J.S.A. 39:4-49.1 (operating vehicle while possessing controlled dangerous substances). In addition, motorists arrested
for traffic offenses almost invariably are removed from the vehicle and secured. 194
This had been the case with Grass and his passengers, and in that situation the officers' justification for searching the vehicle was regarded as minimal. 195 "Thus, in the context of arrests for motor-vehicle violations, the brightholding extends the Chimel rule beyond the logical limits of its prinline Belton
1' 96
ciple.
19 7
At this point, the court discussed its additional concern, noted above,
about pretextual traffic arrests. 198 The court stated that its holding posed no obstacle to the ability of the police to take precautions necessary for their safety.
A search of the person of the arrestee remained permissible, as was a
warrantless search of the vehicle upon probable cause under the automobile
exception.199 Similarly, the doctrine of Michigan v. Long 2°° remained undisturbed, permitting a weapons search of the vehicle when officers possess a reasonable belief that a vehicle's driver or occupants pose a threat to their safety. 2°
Finally, if a traffic law violator remained in actual proximity to his or her vehicle, a Chimel search remained available.2 °2 The court concluded by stating that
194

Id. (citation omitted).

195

See id.

196

Id.

197

See supra note 180 and accompanying text.

198 See Pierce, 642 A.2d at 961-62.

200

See id. at 962.
463 U.S. 1032 (1983).

201

See Pierce, 642 A.2d at 962-63.

199

Id. at 963. Critical commentary concerning the efficacy of Pierce has varied. Compare Jon
F. Sheehan, Comment, State v. Pierce: State Constitutional ProtectionAgainst the Belton Search
Incident to Arrest Rule, 30 NEw ENG. L. REv. 843, 879 (1996) (anticipating no hindrance to law
enforcement), with Susswein, supra note 190, at 870 (citing ambiguity in enforcement of drunk
driving laws). As to the difficulty of weighing the "intangible values" of privacy and autonomy,
202

see Eric Neisser, Seizing on the New Jersey Constitution to ProtectPrivacy, 185 N.J. LAw. 24, 27

(June 1997).
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while it acknowledged the virtue of simple, straightforward rules to guide the
police:
[W]e are convinced that automatic application of the Belton
bright-line rule to authorize vehicular searches incident to all
traffic arrests poses too great a threat to rights guaranteed to
New Jersey's citizens by their State Constitution, and that that
threat to fundamental rights outweighs any incidental benefit
that might accrue to law enforcement because of the simplicity
and predictability of the Belton rule.2 °3
E.

Augmenting the Justificationsof Chimel: Wyoming and Oregon

In 1999, the Supreme Court of Wyoming expressly rejected Belton's
bright-line approach, adding to its discussion of Wyoming's fact-specific inquiry a justification for the search which augmented Chimel's twofold rationale.
In Vasquez v. State,2° the defendant was arrested for driving his pickup truck
while intoxicated. After his arrest, he was handcuffed and placed in a patrol car
while two passengers remained in his vehicle. Officers then noticed empty
bullet casings in the truck bed and in the passenger compartment. 20 5 The passengers were removed from the truck, handcuffed, and asked to kneel on the
ground some distance from the vehicle.2 °6 They were searched for weapons and
none were found. 20 7 An officer then opened a fuse box located on the left side
of the steering wheel, and found a plastic bag containing a white substance later
determined to be cocaine. The officer testified that he had believed the fuse box
to be an ashtray large enough to contain a pistol. 20 8 Vasquez was charged with
possession of the drugs, and his motion to suppress the evidence was denied.2°
He then entered a conditional guilty plea to that charge.2 1°
Turning to the issue of whether the search of the fuse box might be justified as incident to Vasquez's arrest, the court stated that Belton had "virtually
'2
eliminat[ed]" the "'area of control' analysis from searches incident to arrest. 1
203

Pierce,642 A.2d at 963.

204

990 P.2d 476 (Wyo. 1999).

205

Id. at 479.

206

Id. at 479-80.

207

Id. at 479.

208

Id.

209

Id. at 479-80. He also unsuccessfully moved to suppress incriminating statements. Id. at

479.
210

Id. at 480.

211

Id. at 481-82 (footnote omitted).
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That decision, coupled with recent federal analyses concerning the automobile
exception "has simplified Fourth Amendment law regarding automobiles, effectively prohibiting only general searches and essentially eliminating the individual's right to the constitutional protection of a judicially-issued warrant for almost all automobile searches. 21 2 The court acknowledged that in 1982 it had
applied Belton in Lopez v. State,2 3 but it had not then considered2 4if Belton
should apply under Article I, Section 4 of the Wyoming Constitution. '
The court began its analysis by stating that the texts of the Constitution
of Wyoming and the Fourth Amendment were substantially similar,2 15 and that
the state's recent constitutional jurisprudence "has not distinguished between the
two provisions. 2 16 It added that little state constitutional history was available
to indicate the framers' intent.21 7 While textual differences between the state
218 the court stated that the
and federal constitutions overall were not instructive, 21
Wyoming Constitution "is a unique document, the supreme law of our state, and
this is sufficient reason to decide that it should be at issue whenever an individual believes a constitutionally guaranteed right has been violated. 21 9 The court
adopted a "primacy" approach to state constitutional interpretation, under which
it would address a state constitutional issue before proceeding to the federal
issue.22°
The court found the search of Vasquez's truck to be lawful under the
Wyoming Constitution. 221 Reviewing its earlier holdings, the court then stated

212

Id. at 482 (footnote omitted).

213

643 P.2d 682 (Wyo. 1982).

214

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrant
shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, particularly describing
the place to be searched or the person or thing to be seized.

WYO. CONST. art. I, § 4.
215
Vasquez, 990 P.2d at 482-83. The Wyoming provision does require an affidavit to obtain a
warrant. WYO.CONST. art. 1,§ 4.
216
Vasquez, 990 P.2d at 483.
217

Id.

218

Id. at 485.

219

Id.

220

Id. at 485-86. For commentary by an early and leading advocate of this policy, see Hans A

Linde, E Pluribus-Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18 GA. L. REv. 165 (1984); Hans A.
Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REV. 379
(1980). For a contrast between this approach and the interstitial analysis of state constitutional
provisions, see Stewart G. Pollock, State Constitutions as Separate Sources of Fundamental
Rights, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 707 (1983).
221

Vasquez, 990 P.2d at 488.
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in broad language, seemingly applicable to a search incident to arrest which
seeks evidence that is not in fact in danger of destruction:
These past decisions establish that Article I, § 4 allows searches
incident to arrest and can be said to allow automobile searches
because arrestees had possession of it, and the arrestauthorizes
law enforcement to search it for evidence related to the crime.
...The provision requires, however, that searches be reasonable under all of the circumstances ....
In the case of Vasquez, his erratic driving permitted an
investigatory stop, and the strong smell of alcohol and failure of
field sobriety tests authorized an arrest for driving under the
influence based upon probable cause ....The characteristics of
a driving under the influence arrest for suspected alcohol intoxication permit a search of the passenger compartment of the vehicle for any intoxicant, alcohol or narcotic, as evidence related
222
to the crime while driving under the influence.
An earlier statement in the opinion reinforces the notion that, in addition
to preventing accessibility to weapons and the destruction of evidence, a search
incident to arrest may in the court's view be based upon a desire to obtain evidence which is relevant to the arrestee's offense, even though it is not in danger
of being destroyed.2 23 Discussing what it perceived to be the approach of jurisdictions rejecting Belton, the court stated that "[t]hose courts... generally agree
that the search incident to arrest exception is permitted when required for the
protection of the officer, the preservation of evidence, or when it is relevant to
which defendant is being arrested and is reasonable in light of all
the crime for
224
the facts.,

Under the facts of Vasquez, the court added that the discovery of shell
casings and presence of two passengers presented "an officer safety and public
safety concern" which permitted a search incident to arrest although Vasquez
was secure in a patrol car.225 Summing up its approach, the court stated:
In this particular case, we believe that the arrest justified a
search of the passenger compartment of the vehicle and all containers in it, open or closed, locked or unlocked, for evidence

222

Vasquez v. State, 990 P.2d 476, 488 (Wyo. 1999) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

223

Id. at 483.

224

Id. (emphasis added). The court's reference to Chimel's two justifications in a subsequent

portion of its discussion creates some puzzling ambiguity on this point. See id. at 489.
225

Id. at 489.
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related to the crime and for weapons or contraband which presented an officer or a public safety concern.
Is this result a narrower application than Belton? We think
so. This result eschews a bright-line rule and maintains a standard that requires a search be reasonable under all of the circumstances as determined by the judiciary, in light of the historical intent of our search and seizure provision ....It will not
be common that a search of an automobile incident to arrest will
violate that provision, and our decision should not raise new
concerns for law enforcement.2 26
To the extent that Vasquez authorized a vehicular search for nondestructible evidence in the context of a fact-specific inquiry, its approach paralleled a development which had occurred in Oregon's intermediate appellate
courts as they interpreted Article I, Section 9 of the Oregon Constitution. State
v. Fesler,227 an in banc opinion decided by the Court of Appeals in 1984, provides a clear example of that development.
Fesler was arrested for driving while his license was suspended and for
giving a false name to an officer. Before his arrest, he had failed to provide the
police with identification in the name which he claimed as his and had then admitted his true identity to be different. He was frisked after the arrest and the
police did not discover a weapon, wallet, or valid identification. The officer
placed him in a police car. 28 Then, both at Fesler's request and as a matter of
routine procedure, the officer went to lock the car. As the court put it, "Before
locking the car, he searched the interior for identification.,, 229 When the officer
lifted a vest which had been on the back seat, two bags of marijuana fell out of a
pocket. Fesler was convicted for possession of a controlled substance.2 30
Addressing the question of whether the search was permissible as incident to the arrest, the court viewed language of the Oregon Supreme Court in a
non-vehicular case, State v. Caraher,231 as disapproving of Belton's approach
under state constitutional law.
The ... court [in Caraher] chose not to adopt such a "bright
line" approach... and we believe that it will continue to evalu226

Id. (citation omitted).

227

685 P.2d 1014 (Or. Ct. App. 1984) (in banc).

228

Id. at 1016.

229

Id.

230

Id.

231

653 P.2d 942, 945-46 (Or. 1982). Caraher had upheld, as incident to an arrest, the opening

of a purse and the coin compartment of a wallet within it. Id. at 952.
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ate the reasonableness of each search incident to arrest on its
particular facts rather than attempt to draw a "bright line." In
Oregon, a search incident to arrest does not require probable
cause beyond the basis for the arrest itself. It must, however, be
reasonable in scope and, when it is not for the purpose of protecting the officer's safety or preventing the destruction of evidence, it must be related to the crime for which the defendant
was arrested.232
The Court of Appeals observed that in the case before it there was "no
suggestion.., that the search of the car was occasioned by a desire to protect
the officers' safety or to prevent the destruction of evidence. 233 The question
remained whether the police had the right to look for "evidence of the offenses
for which defendant was arrested., 234 The court held that they did. It stated
that while evidence of those crimes, driving with a suspended license and giving
a false identity, "is not generally the kind to be found lying around or hidden
just any place," it was reasonable to conduct the search following Fesler's arrest.2 35 As he had given a false name and false identification and had persisted
in that falsehood until confronted with the results of an investigation, the court
held:
[I]t was reasonable to search for defendant's wallet and the
identification it could be expected to contain. Such a search
would relate to the offense for which defendant was arrested in
two ways: it would further serve to identify defendant and, because defendant's knowledge he was suspended may be a pertinent consideration in such cases, it would further tend to show
defendant's consciousness of guilt if the wallet had been hidden. We hold that a search of the kind conducted here meets
Caraher'srequirement that it be
for evidence of the offense for
2 36
which defendant is under arrest.
The Oregon doctrine is not without its limits. In State v. Brody,237 the
Court of Appeals emphasized that under the requirements of the Oregon
Constitution, "[a] search incident to arrest, if it is not necessary for the protec232

Fesler,685 P.2d at 1016-17 (citations omitted).

233

Id.

234

Id.

235

Id.

236

Id.; see also State v. Spencer, 758 P.2d 885, 888 (Or. Ct. App. 1988); State v. Kirsch, 686

at 1017.

P.2d 446, 448 (Or. Ct. App. 1984).
237
686 P.2d 451 (Or. Ct. App. 1984).
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tion of the officer or the preservation of evidence ...must be related to the
crime for which the person was arrested and must be reasonable in scope, time
and intensity. 2 38 In Brody, a trooper observed the defendant's erratic driving of
his pickup truck, and pulled behind it as the defendant parked in front of a restaurant. Brody, the vehicle's sole occupant, was stopped as he left the truck, and
the trooper smelled the odor of marijuana "coming from defendant's person, his
clothing and the inside of the cab., 239 He also detected an odor of alcohol on
Brody's breath. 24 ° Approaching the truck, the trooper saw in the truck's ashtray
a small, burning marijuana cigarette held by a pair of forceps. 24 1
The trooper asked Brody for identification, and while Brody searched
for it the officer went to his patrol car for a tape recorder.242 When he returned,
Brody produced his driver's license but the marijuana and forceps were gone.
The trooper read Brody his Miranda warnings, administered field sobriety tests,
and arrested him for driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUll). 243 He
then asked Brody to retrieve the marijuana cigarette and forceps, which Brody
produced from under the seat. Defendant was then handcuffed and placed in the
back of the patrol car.
The trooper, assisted by another officer, then searched the cab of the
truck. He first examined an unzipped leather attach6 case which was on the seat
next to the driver. 244 It had no bulges or odor attracting any special attention.
Looking down into it, the trooper saw a fruit can lid with marijuana, seeds and
cigarette papers lying in it. A search of the glove compartment revealed black
capsules (which did not result in any later prosecution), and behind the seat the
trooper found a scale and a white plastic bag containing more marijuana.245 The
state did not argue that the discovery of the marijuana in the attach6 case gave
the officers probable cause to arrest for felony possession of marijuana.246
The court held that the marijuana cigarette and the contents of the attach6 case were admissible, but the remaining search was invalid. 24 ' Brody had
been arrested for driving under the influence of intoxicants, and the trooper reasonably believed that one intoxicant involved was marijuana. The cigarette, in
addition to being contraband, was evidence of the crime for which the defendant
238

Id. at 453.

239

Id. at 452.

240

Id.

241

Id.

242

Brody, 686 P.2d at 452.

243

Id.

244

Id.

245

Id.

246

Id.

247

Id. at 453. The forceps were not discussed. See id.
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had been arrested. Since he had attempted to hide it under the seat, it was reasonable for the officers to believe that they would find more evidence of driving
under the influence of intoxicants in the cab, "and a limited search incident to
the arrest for that evidence was reasonable." 248 The search
' 249that occurred was
not, however, "appropriately limited in scope and intensity.,
The Court of Appeals stated that in determining whether the intensity of
a search is reasonable, it may consider "the nature of the offense and the character of the offender as it was known to the police making the search., 250 Here the
arrest had occurred for driving under the influence of intoxicants. That justified
the seizure of the marijuana cigarette and the search of the open attachd case.25'
However, what took place after the search of the case was "unreasonable exploring, rummaging or ransacking," at least when
the sole justification is the arrest for that offense. Although DUII
is a serious traffic offense, it is still only that - a traffic offense.
A full search of the passenger compartment of a vehicle and the
closed containers in it is not reasonable as incident to a DUll arrest even when, as here, the officer also discovers small amounts
of intoxicants.25 2
The "extended search" violated Article I, Section 9 of the Oregon Constitution.253
F.

Emphasizing the Interplay Between Belton and the Automobile
Exception: New York

New York has developed a doctrine that addresses the factual interplay
between a search incident to arrest and an "automobile exception" search upon
probable cause under Article I, Section 12 of the New York Constitution. A
leading case in the area, People v. Blasich,2 54 involved both New York's treatment of the federal approach to a search incident to arrest, and New York's
248

Brody, 686 P.2d at 452.

249

Id.

250

Id.

251

Id.

252

Id. (quoting State v. Chinn, 373 P.2d 392, 396 (Or. 1962)).

253

Id. In contrast, in State v. Augard, 858 P.2d 463 (Or. Ct. App. 1993), the Court of Appeals

distinguished Brody and found a search of a glove compartment after a DUl arrest to be reasonable in scope and intensity. The court found that the officer had "articulated a clear reason" why
she conducted that search. "She had not found any open containers around the driver's seat and
noted that the compartment 'is about the right size if you want to hide a can of beer or actually a
fifth of whiskey or a small bottle of whiskey."' Id. at 465 n.6.
2M

541 N.E.2d 40 (N.Y. 1989).
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"nexus" requirement when the circumstances surrounding an arrest also provide
the basis for probable cause concerning the vehicle. With regard to a search
incident to arrest, the Court of Appeals stated:
This court has not adopted [New York v. Belton's] bright-line
approach to automobile searches incident to arrest as a matter of
State constitutional law. We have noted, instead, that the
search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant and probable
cause requirements of our State Constitution ...exists only to
protect against the danger that an arrestee may gain access to a
weapon or may be able to destroy or conceal critical evidence.
Thus, we have held that the scope of such a search must be limited to the arrestee's person and the area from within which he
might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. 255
Thus, New York clearly follows a fact-specific approach, resting on Chimel's
dual justifications.
The court continued:
We have also recognized, however, that when the occupant
of an automobile is arrested, the very circumstances that supply
probable cause for the arrest may also give the police probable
cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband, evidence
of the crime, a weapon or some means of escape. If so, a warrantless search of the vehicle is authorized, not as a search incident to arrest, but rather as a search falling within the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.
The automobile exception, it should be noted, is an exception only to the warrant requirement; it does not, in contrast to
the search-incident-to-arrest exception, dispense with the requirement that there be probable cause to search the vehicle.256
In its earlier opinion in People v. Langen,257 the New York Court of
Appeals had stated that the employment of this automobile exception "requires
both probable cause to search the automobile generally and a nexus between the
probable cause to search and the crime for which the arrest is being made. 258
255

Id. at 43 (citations omitted).

256

Id. (citations omitted).

257

456 N.E.2d 1167 (N.Y. 1983).

Id. at 1173. In Langen, the search of a suitcase was permissible, since the defendant had
been arrested for drug possession and the police had probable cause to believe that contraband
related to the offense was located somewhere in the truck. Id.
258
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Thus, in Langen, the court found that the facts constituting the crime which is
the basis for the arrest must also have a relationship to the factual existence of
probable cause, when the automobile exception is to be employed. Accordingly,
in Blasich, the search of a gym bag upon probable cause was held to be permissible because the basis for an arrest for possession of burglar's tools gave the
officers probable cause to believe that the bag would contain further evidence of
that crime. 259
In People v. Galak,26 the court stated that Blaisch had extended the required nexus beyond the "crime" for which there had been an arrest (Langen's
language), to the circumstances prompting the arrest.261 This nexus requirement
has been described as designed to prevent a situation "where a long-dormant
investigation of crimes unrelated to the arrest is proposed as a justification for a
warrantless search following the arrest., 262 New York's nexus approach may
also have the effect, intended or not, of reducing the occurrence of pretextual
arrests which are undertaken in the hope that evidence of wholly independent
offenses might be discovered and that such evidence might in turn provide probable cause for a vehicular search.
IV. JURISDICTIONS ENDORSING BELTON

In those jurisdictions that have elected to adopt Belton's approach as
part of their state constitutional doctrine, the extent to which its benefits have
been discussed has varied. Connecticut, Utah, South Dakota and Iowa have
endorsed Belton without extensive elaboration, perhaps finding its virtues to be
self-evident.
A.

GeneralEndorsements: Connecticut, Utah, South Dakota, and Iowa

In 1992, State v. Waller263 confirmed the Connecticut Supreme Court's
constitution 264
as permitting
Section 7 passenger
of the statecompartment
interpretation
of article
when
the arresteea
of anfirst,
automobile's
warrantless search

259

541 N.E.2d at 44. Although the defendant had not been placed under arrest for that offense,

the existence of the basis for the arrest provided a sufficient predicate for the search. Id. at 44-45.
616 N.E.2d 842 (N.Y. 1993).
260
261

Id. at 844.

262

Id. at 845.

263

612 A.2d 1189 (Conn. 1992).

264

The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from
unreasonable searches and seizures; and no warrant to search any place, or to seize
any person or things, shall issue without describing them as nearly as may be, nor
without probable cause supported by oath or affirmation.

CONN. CONST. art. I,

§ 7.
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is detained at the scene. 265 The court rejected the defendant's argument that his
detention in a police car had removed the justification for the search. 266 In
1981, in State v. KC.C.,2 6 7 the Supreme Court of Utah tersely responded to an
arrestee's state constitutional objection to the search of a pickup cab with its
approval of Belton. 268 As recently as in 1997, the Utah Court of Appeals expressed its reluctance to explore a different approach in the absence of contrary
precedent.2 69
In State v. Rice,27 ° the Supreme Court of South Dakota applied the standard of reasonableness of Article VI, Section 11 of the state constitution 27 , in
concluding that a search paralleling Belton's scope was permissible. While the
facts of Rice included a potential justification based upon the officer's observation of a weapon, the court characterized the search as one incident to arrest272
and subsequent cases have regarded it as applying Belton's rule.27 3 In Rice, an
automobile passenger had been arrested pursuant to a bench warrant, after he
had been asked to leave the car by the arresting officer. The officer saw him lay
a set of nunchaku (a martial arts weapon consisting of two rods joined by a
chain, cable or rope) on the passenger's seat, and a search of the vehicle also
revealed an unsheathed hunting knife and some beer. The glove compartment
was then opened, revealing a small pipe and three baggies, two containing marijuana and one hashish. Rice, the driver, was then arrested for possession of a
controlled substance.2 74 Examining the search of the glove compartment as in-

265

612 A.2d at 1194.

266

See id.

267

636 P.2d 1044 (Utah 1981).

268

Id. at 1046-47. Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution provides:

269

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be
seized.
See State v. Giron, 943 P.2d 1114, 1121 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).

270

327 N.W.2d 128 (S.D. 1982).

271

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrant
shall issue but upon probable cause supported by affidavit, particularly describing
the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized.

S. D. CONST. art. VI, § 11.
272
327 N.W.2d at 131.
273

See State v. Steele, 613 N.W.2d 825, 826-27 (S.D. 2000).

274

See Rice, 327 N.W.2d at 129.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol105/iss1/6

36

Shapiro: New YorkSTATE
v. Belton
and State Constitutional Doctrine
CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE
BELTON AND

20021

cident to the lawful arrest of the passenger, the court noted that under Article VI,
Section l I the standard of reasonableness governed the analysis:
The officer's search revealed, in addition to the already discovered nunchaku, an unsheathed hunting knife which the appellee
was apparently trying to conceal under the floorboard. The
search of the glove compartment which followed was a logical
extension of the search since its contents were readily available
to the occupants prior to their exiting from the vehicle. Applying the test of reasonableness under Article VI, § 11 of our state
constitution to the facts of this case, we hold that the search of
the appellee's vehicle and the compartments therein was a
search incident to arrest, which is permissible under the constitution of this state.275
Similarly, in 1981, the Supreme Court of Iowa stated in State v.
Sanders that "we believe Belton strikes a reasonably fair balance between the
rights of the individual and those of society. We adopt it ...as our rule., 2 77 In
Sanders, defendants had been stopped for a robbery involving a firearm pursuant to a police radio report describing their vehicle as the getaway car. They
were ordered to leave the vehicle and a patdown search preceding the arrest
revealed a knife and large rolls of money. The search of the car's interior after
the arrest produced a loaded pistol and rolls of coins.278 While briefly alluding
to the potential applicability of the automobile exception to the case, the court
stated that, with regard to searches incident to arrest, Belton had addressed continuing uncertainty concerning "on the one hand ....the extent of constitutional
protection ...[and] on the other, the scope of investigative authority. '279 In its
view, the "delicate balancing', 280 of Belton provided an appropriate approach
under Article I, Section 8 of the Iowa Constitution.2 8
27 6

275

Id. at 131-32.

276

312 N.W.2d 534 (Iowa 1981).

277

Id. at 539.

278

Id. at 537.

279

Id. at 538.

280

Id.

281

See id. at 539. Article I, Section 8 of the Iowa Constitution reads as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable seizures and searches shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but on probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons and things to be
seized.
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Changing Course: Ohio

Until April of 2002, the Supreme Court of Ohio had declined to follow
Belton's approach under Section 14, Article 1 of the Ohio Constitution 282 when
the defendant had been arrested for a traffic violation. That approach, similar to
New Jersey's,283 was established ten years ago in State v. Brown.2 84 In Brown,
after the defendant was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol and
was placed in a patrol car, an officer searched his vehicle and opened an
unlocked box which was in the glove compartment. The box contained seven
sugar cubes laced with LSD. Brown was prosecuted for drug possession. The
trial court suppressed the LSD, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. 285 The
Supreme Court agreed that the search violated the Ohio Constitution.2 86 The
court noted that Belton had involved an arrest for the offense of possession of
marijuana, and added that if it was intended to permit an automobile search
solely because ... one of its occupants [has been arrested] on
any charge, we decline to adopt its rule.... We do not believe

that the certainty generated by a bright-line test justifies a rule
that automatically allows police officers to search every nook
and cranny of an automobile just because the driver is arrested
for a traffic violation. 87
The court also believed that the search was unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment. 88
In State v. Murrell,289 the court's earlier interpretation of Section 14,
Article I was expressly reconsidered and overruled. Murrell had been stopped
for exceeding a posted speed limit, and the officer's check of his license indi282

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and possessions, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no
warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person and things to be
seized.

OHO CONST. art. I, § 14.

283

See supra notes 177-203 and accompanying text.

284

588 N.E.2d 113 (Ohio 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 862 (1992).

285

Id.

286

Id. at 115.

287
Id. Curiously, the court stated that the search in Belton had also been supported by probable
cause to search the vehicle for additional marijuana or evidence of its use. Id. As noted earlier,
the U.S. Supreme Court did not address that issue. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
288

Brown, 588 N.E.2d at 115.

289

764 N.E.2d 986 (Ohio 2002).
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cated that an outstanding arrest warrant had been issued for Murrell's failure to
pay child support. 290 He was arrested, handcuffed, and placed in the back of a
police car. The officer then conducted a search of the car, during which he
opened a small cloth bag located on the floor in front of the driver's seat. 29 1 The
bag contained crack cocaine, and Murrell was prosecuted for its possession. At
the suppression hearing, the officer testified that the traffic stop was routine, that
he never perceived himself to be in danger, and that he would not have impounded the car had he not found the cocaine. 292
The trial court granted the motion to suppress, and the Court of Appeals
reversed, upholding the search on the basis of Belton and distinguishing Brown
on the ground that Murrell's arrest was for nonpayment of child support rather
than a traffic violation.29 3 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio noted that
Brown's statement that the search had been violative of the Fourth Amendment
had been erroneous.294 Consequently, it stated that the only rationale supporting
the decision in Brown was its state constitutional analysis.295 Despite the earlier
decision of the Court of Appeals to distinguish Brown, the Ohio Supreme Court
chose to reconsider Brown's view of Section 14, Article I.
The court noted that Ohio's provision and the Fourth Amendment contain virtually identical language, 296 and that consequently they had been interpreted as affording the same protection "unless there are persuasive reasons to
find otherwise. 29 7 The court noted that Brown had cited no authorities for its
conclusion that Section 14, Article I was "more stringent" than the Fourth
Amendment, and stated its belief that most jurisdictions had "chosen to fully
embrace Belton's bright-line rule. 29 8 The court observed that Belton is applicable only when a lawful custodial arrest, grounded in probable cause, has occurred, and that the circumstances of the arrest eased concerns about a lack of
probable cause to conduct a search.299 It stated that "Belton does not authorize
indiscriminate fishing expeditions, ' 30 adding that its standard represented a
290

Id. at 987-88.

291

Id. at 988.

292

Id.

293

Id.

294

Id. at 990-91. The court observed that "the Belton court purposely determined to craft a

bright-line rule of sufficient scope to encompass the facts of Brown, as well as those of the case
sub judice." Id. at 990.
295
State v. Murrell, 764 N.E.2d 986, 991 (Ohio 2002).
296

Id.

297

Id. (quoting State v. Robinette, 685 N.E.2d 762, 767 (Ohio 1997)).

298

Id. at 991-92.

299

Id. at 992.

3W

Id.
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calculated conclusion by the Supreme Court that a bright-line rule presented
advantages. 30 1 The court added:
We find it significant that Justice Stewart, who wrote the majority opinion in Belton, also wrote the majority opinion in Chimel,
which established strict limitations on the "search incident to arrest" exception, and which reversed the conviction at issue in
that case as based on a search the Chimel court determined to be
unreasonable.... Obviously, Justice Stewart and the other justices in the majority in Belton believed that the specific concerns at issue in that case justified extension of the Chimel rule
to cases involving an arrest of the occupant of a motor vehicle.
Both Chimel and Belton are seminal Fourth Amendment decisions that contribute to a comprehensive jurisprudence .... 3 02
The court stated that the same considerations that motivated the Supreme Court
led it to conclude that Brown had failed to appreciate Belton's advantages or
present persuasive reasons for departing from the principle that Section 14,
Article3 I and the Fourth Amendment "should be harmonized whenever possi, 30
ble.
C.

OtherExtensive Discussion:Arkansas, Wisconsin, and Idaho

In Stout v. State,3° the Supreme Court of Arkansas has also explained
that its endorsement of Belton's approach under Article 2, Section 15 of the
Arkansas Constitution 30 5 was consistent with its general policy of mirroring
Fourth Amendment analysis when interpreting that provision. Stout had been
stopped for crossing a highway's center line while he was driving his sister's
hatchback station wagon. He was asked to leave the vehicle to perform some
field sobriety tests, and when he was found to be sober he was issued a warning
ticket.30 6 Stout had also explained that he was en route from Texas to Wisconsin
301 Murrell, 764 N.E.2d at 992.
302

Id. (citation omitted).

303

Id. at 992-93. Two justices dissented. See id. at 993 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting); see also id.

at 996 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).
304

305

898 S.W.2d 457 (Ark. 1995).
The right of the people of this State to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and
no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to
be seized.

ARK. CONST. art. II, § 15.
306

Stout, 898 S.W.2d at 459.
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after an extended visit, and as the officer saw no luggage or clothing in the
hatchback he asked for permission to search the vehicle. Stout consented to an
examination from the outside, and the officer saw what appeared to be a marijuana cigarette butt in plain view. 30 7 He opened the door, smelled the cigarette,
and confirmed that it was marijuana. Stout was placed under arrest and handcuffed, and he was asked to stand on the side of the highway. The officer then
searched the hatchback area, raised the flap covering the spare tire compartment,
and smelled a strong odor of marijuana.3 °8 Inside the compartment he found a
metal container holding 10.6 pounds of marijuana wrapped in several packages. 3° Charged with possession of the drugs, Stout objected to the search on
federal and state constitutional grounds.310
The Arkansas Supreme Court noted that it had previously held that the
hatchback area of an automobile qualifies as a portion of the passenger compartment under Belton, and that the search had been valid under the Fourth
Amendment as incident to arrest.311 Turning to the state constitutional argument, it then noted, "Of course, we could hold that the Arkansas Constitution
provides greater protection against unreasonable searches than does the
Constitution of the United States, but we see no reason to do so.,' 312 It observed
that the wording of each "is comparable, and through the years, in construing
this part of the Arkansas Constitution, we have followed the Supreme Court
cases." 31 3 Holding the search to be valid, it added:
It seems especially appropriate to do so in this case because
courts in the past had great difficulty in balancing the competing interests and, at the same time, setting out workable rules
for search and seizure cases involving automobiles .... Belton
has provided a practical and workable rule for fourteen years,
and we have followed it on many occasions. Consequently, we
choose to continue to interpret "unreasonable search" in Article
2, Section 15 of the Constitution of Arkansas in the same manner the Supreme Court interprets 3the
Fourth Amendment to the
14
Constitution of the United States.
307

Id.

308

Id. at 459-60.

309

Id. at 459.
Id. He also unsuccessfully raised an objection under the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Proce-

310

dure. See id. at 460-61.
311
Id. at 460.
312

Id.

313

Id.

314

Id.; see also State v. Earl, 970 S.W.2d 789, 793 n.2 (Ark. 1998) (dictum).
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The Wisconsin Supreme Court's explanation of a similar mirroring
process has been accompanied by a more detailed discussion of the perceived
strengths of Belton. In 1986, State v. Fry315 involved that court's explicit consideration of some of the practical consequences of the federal rule. Fry was
arrested for trespass while standing outside of his recently-occupied car, and a
search of the locked glove compartment had been justified as incident to the
arrest.316 He was convicted for possession of the weapon discovered during the
search, and argued that his lack of access to the vehicle precluded the search
under Wisconsin's statutory requirements, as well as under state and federal
constitutional standards. 3 17 The court stated that Wisconsin's statute governing
a search incident to arrest,3 18 enacted in 1969, was consistent with both Chimel's
"immediate control" test 19 and with Belton, which in the court's view merely
constituted "an application of the Chimel test to a specific factual situation. 32 °
Accordingly, as the search was authorized by Belton, it was also permissible
under the statute. 321 Turning to Fry's argument under the state constitution, the
court then examined his claim that it "should reject Belton's conclusion that the
interior of an automobile is within the immediate presence or control of a defen322
dant who is not actually in the vehicle during the search.,
The court noted that article I, section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution
is "virtually identical" to the Fourth Amendment,323 and that the court had "con315 388 N.W.2d 565 (Wis. 1986).
316
Id. at 567-68.
317

Id. at 568.

318 WIS. STAT.

§ 968.11 (1969) stated:

Scope of search incident to lawful arrest. When a lawful arrest is made, a law
enforcement officer may reasonably search the person arrested and an area
within that person's immediate presence for the purpose of:
(1) Protecting the officer from attack;
(2) Preventing the person from escaping;
(3) Discovering and seizing the fruits of the crime; or
(4) Discovering and seizing any instruments, articles or things which may have
been used in the commission of, or which may constitute evidence of, the offense.
320

Fry, 388 N.W.2d at 570.
Id. at 571.

321

Id. at 572.

322

Id. at 573.

323

Id. WIS. CONST. art. I, § 11 states:

319

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
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sistently and routinely" conformed state constitutional doctrine to that developed under the federal provision. 324 This was the result of its decision both "to
prevent the confusion caused by differing standards" 325 and to implement the
intent of Wisconsin's framers.3 2 The court stated that it was "reluctant to construe [the] state constitutional provision differently than the fourth amendment,
especially since the two provisions are intended to protect the same interests"
and it was "unconvinced that the Supreme Court provides less protection than
327
intended by the search and seizure provision of the Wisconsin Constitution."
Belton's bright-line rule did not constitute an approach which undermined the state constitutional protections of Wisconsin citizens.32 8 Instead, the
rule was a simple and reasonable one.
A police officer may assume under Belton that the interior of an
automobile is within the reach of a defendant when the defendant is still at the scene of an arrest, but the defendant is not
physically in the vehicle. We cannot say as a matter of fact in
all cases that a defendant never could regain access to the interior of an automobile after initially leaving the vehicle. Thus
we would seriously undermine police security if we adopted as
a matter of constitutional fact the rule that the interior of an
automobile never is within reach of a suspect who is outside the
vehicle at the arrest scene .... 329
The alternative to Belton's approach, determining access on a case-bycase basis, was "unworkable... because such momentary escapes are not predictable., 330 Lack of uniformity would also result from such an individualized
of
approach.3 31 Consequently, Belton was held to be an appropriate application 332
Wisconsin's search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement.
Concluding its discussion, the court returned to the subject of conforming state
search and seizure doctrine to that developed under the Fourth Amendment. It

324

particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.
Fry, 388 N.W.2d at 573.

325

Id. at 574.

326

Id.

327

Id.

328

Id.

329

Id.

330

Id.

331

Id. at 575.

332

Id.
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added that its approach was "not only consistent with the text of Wisconsin's
search and seizure provision, its constitutional history and its judicial history,
but is also in accord with sound public policy." 333 Fry's endorsement of Belton
was recently reaffirmed in State v. Pallone.3 4
In 1998, in State v. Charpentier,335 the Supreme Court of Idaho found
Belton's approach to be appropriate under Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho
Constitution 336 "for the reasons set forth in Belton and additional considerations
not articulated in that opinion., 337 Charpentier was stopped for speeding, and
the officer determined that her driver's license had been suspended and that her
restricted license did not permit her to drive at that time.338 She was arrested for
"driving without privileges" and was handcuffed and placed in a patrol car. The
officer then returned to search her vehicle and discovered a small amount of
marijuana, two plastic straws, and a small pouch containing a plastic bag in
which straws and a yellow-white substance, later identified as methamphetamine, were found.3 39 Charpentier was arrested for possession of a controlled
substance and moved to suppress the methamphetamine. The state relied upon
the search as incident to her arrest. 34° The trial court framed the issue as
whether Article I, Section 17 permits a search of a vehicle's passenger compartment, including containers, as an incident of a traffic arrest "[w]hen a defendant, following a traffic sto, has been removed from a vehicle, handcuffed and
placed in a patrol car ....341 Holding that it did not, the trial court
suppressed
3 3
the evidence. 342 Its decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals. 4
333

Id.

334 613 N.W.2d 568 (Wis. 2000).

While a puzzling passage in Pallone reflects the court's
apparent view that a search authorized by Belton and Fry requires the presence of circumstances
indicating "a heightened threat to officer safety or a need to discover or preserve evidence," id. at
579-81, it is clear that the court regarded this as an implementation of Belton and Fry, rather than
a modification of their approach. See id. at 579.
335 962 P.2d 1033 (Idaho 1998). This opinion was a substitute for the court's earlier opinion of
August 27, 1997. See generally J.Tim Thomas, Casenote, Belton is Not Welcome: Idaho's Rejection and Subsequent Adoption of the Belton Rule in State v. Charpentier, 35 IDAHO L. REV. 125,
146-51 (1998).
336
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant
shall issue without probable cause shown by affidavit, particularly describing the
place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized.
IDAHO CONST. art. 1, § 11.
337 962 P.2d at 1036.
338

Id. at 1034-35.

339

Id. at 1035.

3Q

Id.

341

Id.

342

Id.
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The Supreme Court of Idaho observed, as had the lower courts, that the
search was permissible under Belton. It then discussed, as had the U.S.
Supreme Court, the need for clarity on the matter. The court stated that "[i]t is
unlikely that there is any area of activity that places the police and public in
contact with one another on a recurring basis more than the operation of a motor
vehicle." 344 It added that arrests are certain to occur, and "there is a need for
clear rules that give both the police and the public an understanding of what the
police can and cannot do." 34 It noted that Belton's analysis had developed in
response to these concerns, adding "[t]he disarray in results noted by the United
States Supreme Court and the need for a clear rule understood by both the public
and the police are compelling reasons to adopt the rule enunciated in Belton as
the proper interpretation of Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution." 346 The
court stated that there was nothing in Idaho's history or jurisprudence that required a contrary result, and observed that the consistency of having the same
law applicable under347the state and federal constitutions "makes sense to the police and the public.",
The court then went on to discuss other factors "worthy of note," although they had not been cited in Belton. It set forth its view of the diminished
expectations of privacy connected with an automobile:
The use of the automobile on public roads is extensively regulated. Drivers must be licensed. The roadways belong to the
public. There are insurance requirements for operators of
automobiles. There are extensive safety requirements for automobiles. In some areas there are emission standards. Inspections are authorized for various purposes, and there are limitations on the window tinting that is allowed that would exclude
vision into the vehicle. These rules do not address the issue of
the search of an automobile directly. However, they are indicative of the fact that the automobile is not comparable to the
home. The expectation of privacy within the automobile falls
far short of that accorded the sanctuary of the home. The level
of privacy due the automobile is satisfied by the requirement
the occupant before a
that there must be a lawful arrest of
348
place.
take
may
contents
the
of
search

343

Charpentier,962 P.2d at 1035.

3"

Id. at 1036.

345

Id.

3"

Id. at 1037.

347

Id.

3W

Id.
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The court also stated that it is important to know that when the arrest of
an occupant of a car has been made, "the automobile can be left untended with
the assurance that any weapons, evidence of crime or contraband have been
349
removed from the reach of passersby or confederates in unlawful activity.
The court concluded by emphasizing the clarity of its approach:
Under the rule adopted by this Court, the police know what they
can do after they have made a lawful arrest. The public knows
the extent of protection afforded from a search while utilizing
the automobile. The automobile is not a haven for weapons,
contraband or evidence of criminal activity once the threshold
requirement that there be a lawful arrest has been reached. It is
well that people know that and guide their conduct accordingly.35 °
It described
its rule as "straightforward, easily applied and predictably en3 51
forced."
V. CONCLUSION
As the opinions endorsing Belton illustrate, state constitutional decisionmaking in assessing the validity of a vehicular search incident to arrest has
produced strong disagreement about the desirability of the federal approach.
The cases have often reflected intensive analysis and a true diversity of views
concerning the proper balancing of constitutionally protected privacy interests
and the genuine needs of law enforcement.
Somewhat more surprisingly, however, there have been significant and
often innovative differences in both the methodology by which competing goals
have been reconciled and in the characterization of those personal interests at
stake. The stark contrast between Washington's recognition of heightened expectations of privacy in locked containers and the Supreme Court of Idaho's
discussion of diminished expectations of vehicular privacy is of course no accident. It is the logical outgrowth of the extent to which our state constitutions
have truly come to reflect the variety of values among our states. It is also very
striking that the settled nature of federal doctrine in this critical and muchdiscussed area, reflected in last year's Supreme Court oral argument in Thomas,
has enhanced the prominence of state constitutional adjudication as a setting
within which the merits of Belton may still be debated.

349
Charpentier,962 P.2d at 1037. The court recognized that "[t]his is not always a concern,
but it is a sufficient concern to address." Id.
350
Id.
351

Id.
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It is also perhaps worth noting that the absence of a discernible, prevalent trend in this area may indicate that the modem development of diverse and
independent state constitutional decision making is truly evolving. At about the
same time that Belton was decided, Professor Ronald K. L. Collins wrote insightfully about the dangers of poorly-reasoned "reactionary" state constitutional analyses which respond to unpopular federal doctrine. His observations
concerning the use of a state constitutional provision as merely a reactive instrument to be used in rejecting a specific federal approach are as true today as
they were then:
An instrumentalist approach to decision making does not provide the necessary decisional framework in which to determine
questions of consistence and uniformity. . . . Instead, a reactionary approach uses the state charter in a piecemeal fashion,
whenever the occasion may arise - in the mind of judges - for
purposes of philosophical disagreement or in order to insulate a
controversial decision from the Supreme Court review. Seen in
state constitution becomes
this light, the sovereign law
352of the
little more than a plaything.
State constitutional decisions which have considered, and at
times rejected, the Belton doctrine have avoided the pitfalls of a
poorly-reasoned, result-oriented approach to state constitutional law.
Instead, the diversity of these analyses is a testament to the careful
weighing of the relative values of bright-line rules for law enforcement,
individual privacy, and police safety. It is predictable that such deeplyheld diversity of viewpoint, sometimes so prominent in our federal system, will continue to flourish on this issue.

352

Ronald K. L. Collins, Commentary, Reliance on State Constitutions-Away From a Reac-

tionaryApproach, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 1, 13-14 (1981).
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